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INTRODUCTION 
This Article focuses on African Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) 
judiciaries.  African RTA judiciaries entertain a broad range of 
disputes from an extremely broad category of litigants.  They are not 
simply custodians of the trading arrangements; in fact, they do much 
less dispute settlement around trade issues compared to the broad 
range of cases they have assumed jurisdiction over.  Many of these 
judiciaries, as we shall see, have also often entertained cases that are 
well beyond their treaty defined jurisdictional bases.  So while it is 
true, as William Davey has correctly argued, that RTA judiciaries 
have rarely been used to resolve trade disputes, in Africa there has 
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been an exponential use of these judiciaries without much 
acknowledgement in the academic literature.1 
As this Article also shows, another feature of African RTA 
judiciaries that comes out clearly, is the boldness of their decisions in 
relation to the fact they are relatively new institutions operating in a 
context in which adherence to notions of national sovereignty is very 
strong.  The East African Court of Justice (EACOJ) has, for example, 
decided cases relating to human rights, even though there is no 
explicit treaty basis for the court to assume jurisdiction over human 
rights cases that challenge the conduct of Member State governments.  
For taking such bold steps, the leaders of the East African Community 
(EAC) amended the Treaty Establishing the East African Community 
as a statement of the disapproval of EACOJ’s decision in the Nyong’o 
case.  Another example is the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice whose jurisdiction was expanded 
in 2005 to allow cases challenging the conduct of Member States with 
respect to human rights, a jurisdiction it has since not spared in its 
use.  In short, this Article shows that African RTA judiciaries are not 
sleeping sentinels of the treaties under which they are established.  
This Article is, therefore, a call for more attention to be focused on 
these judiciaries.  Of the eight RTAs that are regarded as pillars to the 
African Economic Community, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and 
the Intergovernmental Organization on Development (IGAD) do not 
appear to have operational judiciaries. 
I 
THE COMMON MARKET FOR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
(COMESA) COURT OF JUSTICE 
The Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (Treaty) established the COMESA Court of Justice 
(COJ).2  The Treaty mandates that the COJ “shall ensure the 
adherence to law in the interpretation and application of this Treaty.”3  
Judgments of the COJ are “final and conclusive and not open to 
appeal.”4  “Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
th[e] Treaty or any of the matters referred to the [COJ] . . . shall not 
 
1 See William J. Davey, The Soft Drinks Case: The WTO and Regional Agreements, 8 
WORLD TRADE REV. 5, 15 (2009).  By contrast, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights has received lots of attention, see, e.g., Obiora C. Okafor, THE AFRICAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, ACTIVIST FORCES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 2007. 
2 Treaty Establishing the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, 2314 
U.N.T.S. 265 (Entered into force Dec. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Treaty Establishing 
COMESA]. 
3 Id. art. 19. 
4 Id. art. 31(1). 
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be subjected to any method of settlement other than those provided 
for in th[e] Treaty.”5 
The COJ is composed of seven judges appointed by the Authority 
and chosen based upon their qualifications as impartial and 
independent judges in their own countries.6  No two judges may be 
nationals of the same Member State.7  The judges on the COJ serve a 
five-year term and may be reappointed to an additional five-year 
term.8  The judges on the COJ were first appointed by the Authority 
on June 30, 1998.9  In March 2003, the Authority decided that the seat 
of the COJ would be Khartoum, Sudan.10 
Decisions of the COJ on the interpretation of the Treaty precede 
the decisions of the Member States’ national courts.11  However, 
“[e]xcept where the jurisdiction is conferred on the [COJ] by or under 
[the] Treaty, disputes to which the Common Market is a party shall 
not on that ground alone, be excluded from the jurisdiction of national 
courts.”12  As discussed below, Member States’ national courts may 
request a preliminary ruling from the COJ where a question is raised 
before such national court concerning the application or interpretation 
of the Treaty or the validity of an action by COMESA.13  Where any 
such question is raised in a Member State’s national court, and the 
laws of that Member State do not provide for a judicial remedy for 
such violation of the Treaty, the national court shall refer the entire 
matter to the COJ.14 
II 
JURISDICTION 
The Treaty provides that the COJ has “jurisdiction to adjudicate 
upon all matters which may be referred to it pursuant to this Treaty.”15  
“The Authority, the Council or a Member State may request the Court 
to give an advisory opinion regarding questions of law arising from 
 
5 Id. art. 34(1). 
6 Id. art. 20. 
7 Id. art. 20(2). 
8 Id. art. 21(1). 
9 COMESA Court of Justice, ABOUT COMESA, http://about.comesa.int/lang-en 
/institutions/court-of-justice (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
10 Id. 
11 Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 2, art. 29(2). 
12 Id. art. 29(1). 
13 Id. art. 30(1). 
14 Id. art. 30(2). 
15 Id. art. 23. 
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the provisions of this Treaty affecting [COMESA].”16  Where a 
Member State considers that another Member State or the C uncil has 
acted or omitted to act in violation of the Treaty, such Member State 
may refer the matter to the COJ.17  Member States may also refer 
matters involving: 
[T]he legality of any act, regulation, directive or decision of the 
Council on the grounds that such act, regulation, directive or 
decision is ultra vires or unlawful or an infringement of the 
provisions of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application 
or amounts to a misuse or abuse of power.18 
Where the Secretary-General considers that a Member State has 
violated the Treaty, such findings are submitted to the Member State 
concerned so that the Member State may submit its findings on the 
matter.19  Where such Member State does not submit its findings, or 
such findings are unsatisfactory, the Secretary-General then presents 
the issue to the Council for consideration.20  If “the Council fails to 
resolve the matter, the Council shall direct the Secretary-General to 
refer the matter to the [COJ].”21 
Natural and legal persons may refer to the COJ, matters that 
involve actions or omissions of the Council or a Member State which 
violate the Treaty.22  “[W]here the matter for determination relates to 
any act, regulation, directive or decision by a Member State, such 
person shall not refer the matter for determination under this Article 
unless he has first exhausted local remedies in the national courts or 
tribunals of the Member State.”23  This grant of standing to natural 
and legal persons illustrates the broad jurisdiction of not only the 
COMESA COJ, but indeed all other African RTA judiciaries 
discussed in this paper.24 
The COJ also has “jurisdiction to hear disputes between 
[COMESA] and its employees that arise out of the application and 
interpretation of the Staff Rules and Regulations of the Secretariat or 
the terms and conditions of employment of the employees of 
 
16 Id. art. 32(1). 
17 Id. art. 24(1). 
18 Id. art. 24(2). 
19 Id. art. 25(1). 
20 Id. art. 25(2). 
21 Id. art. 25(3). 
22 Id. art. 26. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.; see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, GOVERNING THE WORLD INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS 116 (2005) (arguing that “African institutions anticipate 
international organizations charged with discharging the kinds of plenary executive, 
legislative, and even judicial powers once associated exclusively with national 
governments.”). 
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[COMESA].”25  The COJ may also hear claims by third parties 
against COMESA, or any of its institutions, for acts of COMESA 
employees in the performance of their official duties.26 
Where COMESA, or any of its institutions, is a party to an 
agreement, and such agreement allows the COJ to arbitrate, then the 
COJ has jurisdiction to hear the dispute.27  Where there is a dispute 
between Member States and they make a special agreement to allow 
the COJ to hear the case, the COJ has jurisdiction to hear such 
dispute.28  Member States’ national courts may also request a 
preliminary ruling from the COJ where a question is raised before 
such national court concerning the application or interpretation of the 
Treaty or the validity of an action by COMESA.29  Where any such 
question is raised in a Member State’s national court, and the laws of 
that Member State do not provide for a judicial remedy for such 
violation of the Treaty, the national court shall refer the entire matter 
to the COJ.30 
The COMESA Council of Ministers is explicitly given the power 
and responsibility to “give directions to all other subordinate organs 
of the Common Market other than the [COJ] in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction.”31  This clause gives the COJ freedom from intervention 
by the executive and legislative institutions of COMESA.  Perhaps 
more important is Article 34 of the Treaty, which provides that the 
COJ shall be the sole interpreter of the Treaty.32  Where a dispute has 
been referred to the COJ, “Member States shall refrain from any 
action which might be detrimental to the resolution of the dispute or 
might aggravate the dispute.”33  In addition, both Member States and 
the Council must “take, without delay, the measures required to 
implement a judgment of the [COJ,]”34 and the COJ “may prescribe 
such sanctions as it shall consider necessary to be imposed against a 
party who defaults in implementing the decisions of the Court.”35 
Former Lord President of the COMESA COJ, the Honorable Mr. 
Justice A. M. Akiwumi, has opined that the COJ has “brought 
 
25 Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 2, art. 27(1). 
26 Id. art. 27(2). 
27 Id. art. 28(a). 
28 Id. art. 28(b). 
29 Id. art. 30(1). 
30 Id. art. 30(2). 
31 Id. art. 9(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
32 Id. art. 34(1). 
33 Id. art. 34(2). 
34 Id. art. 34(3). 
35 Id. art. 34(4). 
250 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 12, 245 
together persons of differing legal traditions to produce a smooth-
functioning and authoritative institution,”36 which is an impressive 
feat given the varying legal traditions of the COMESA Member 
States. 
III 
THE EAST AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
The EACOJ is established under the Treaty Establishing the East 
African Community.37  The EACOJ is tasked with “ensur[ing] the 
adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and 
compliance with [the EAC] Treaty.”38  The EAC Treaty gives the 
EACOJ “jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of [the 
EAC] Treaty . . . [as well as] such other original, appellate, human 
rights and other jurisdiction as . . . determined by the Council . . . [in] 
a protocol . . . .”39  Decisions of the EACOJ are “final, binding and 
conclusive and not open to appeal . . .”40 and “[a]ny dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of [the EAC] Treaty . . . 
shall not be subjected to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for in [the EAC] Treaty.”41  The EACOJ became operational 
on November 30, 2001, but has since remained in a transitional 
period, meaning that it only convenes when the need to do so arises 
because the Summit has not yet determined that there is enough 
business to make it fully operational.42 
The EAC Treaty provides that the judges on the EACOJ are to be 
appointed to the Summit on recommendation by the Partner States.43  
 
36 Justice A.M. Akiwumi, Chariman, Tribunal to Investigate the Conduct of Judges in 
Kenya, Address at the African Development Forum IV (Oct. 3, 2004) available at 
http://www.uneca.org/adfiv/documents/speeches_and_presentations/speech_akiwumi.htm.  
Notably, in May 2010, the COMESA COJ announced that it had contracted with a 
company to develop a website which “will provide information on the establishment of the 
Court, how to access the Court, judgements [sic], advisory opinions, arbitration awards, 
pending cases and news updates from the Court.  Once operational, the public will be able 
to file cases and even conduct searches on cases and rulings online.”  COMESA Court of 
Justice to Improve Visibility, COMESA, http://www.comesa.int/lang-en/component 
/content/article/34-general-news/382-comesa-court-of-justice-to-improve-its-visibility (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
37 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 
U.N.T.S. 255 (establishing a regional economic community between Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania) (Entered into Force July 7, 2000, Amended Dec. 14, 
2006 and Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Treaty Establishing EAC]. 
38 Id. art. 23(1). 
39 Id. art. 27. 
40 Id. art. 35(1). 
41 Id. art. 38(1). 
42 East African Community Portal, EAST AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE—ROLE OF THE 
COURT, www.eac.int/organs/EACoJ.html?start=2 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
43 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 24(1). 
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Before the 2006 amendments, the EAC Treaty provided that the 
EACOJ would consist of no m re than six judges with no more than 
two from each of the original three Partner States.44  The EAC Treaty 
as amended split the EAC into a First Instance Division and an 
Appellate Division and provides that the court shall be composed of a 
maximum of fifteen judges with a maximum of ten for the First 
Instance Division and five for the Appellate Division.45  No more than 
two judges from each of the now five Partner States can be appointed 
to the First Instance Division and no more than one from each Partner 
State to the Appellate Division.46  The seat of the EACOJ is to be 
determined by the Summit.47  The Summit has not yet determined the 
permanent seat of the EACOJ, but the temporary seat is in Arusha, 
Tanzania.48  In August 2010, the EACOJ Court of Appeals held a 
sitting in Nairobi, Kenya, as part of its program to familiarize East 
African citizens of its role while announcing the appellate decision in 
the Nyong’o case.49  It has also had similar temporary sittings in other 
East African cities such as Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and Kampala. 
The EAC Treaty states that the decisions of the EACOJ on the 
interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty have precedence 
over the decisions of the national courts.50  Where jurisdiction is 
conferred upon the EACOJ, the national courts have no jurisdiction.51  
However, simply because the Community is a party to a dispute does 
not mean that the dispute is excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
national courts.52 
The EACOJ expanded the scope of its jurisdiction in 2007 with its 
decision in Nyong’o v. Attorney General of Kenya.53  The Court had 
been petitioned under Article 3054 to enjoin the swearing-in of 
Kenya’s nine members of the East African Legislative Assembly 
 
44 Id. art. 24. 
45 Id. art. 24(2). 
46 Id. art. 24(1). 
47 Id. art. 47. 
48 East African Court of Justice—Review of Judgments, EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
PORTAL, http://www.eac.int/organs/EACoJ.html?start=5 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
49 Press Release, East African Community, East African Court Takes Justice Closer to 
the People (Aug. 13, 2010) available at http://news.eac.int/index.php?option=com 
_content&view=article&id=276:EACoJ-closer-to-the-people&catid=48:eac-latest&Itemid 
=69. 
50 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 33(2). 
51 Id. art. 33(1). 
52 Id. 
53 Nyong’o v. Att’y Gen. of Kenya, Reference No. 1 (E. Afr. Ct. J. 2006), 
http://www.EACoJ.org/docs/judgements/EACOJ_Reference_No_1_2006.pdf. 
54 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 30. 
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(EALA).55  The claimants contended that Kenya had violated Article 
50 of the EAC Treaty when selecting its nine members and that the 
elections were therefore void.56  Article 50 provides that “the elected 
members shall, as much as feasible, be representative of specified 
groups, and sets [sic] out the qualifications for election.”57  The 
Attorney General of Kenya, in a petition for the respondents, argued 
that Article 52(1) specifically reserved jurisdiction to the High Court 
of Kenya, and so the EACOJ did not have jurisdiction to hear the 
case.58  That article provides, in relevant part “Any question that may 
arise whether any person is an elected member of the Assembly . . . 
shall be determined by the institution of the Partner State that 
determines questions of the election of members of the National 
Assembly. . . .”59  The EACOJ, however, disagreed, finding that since 
an Article 50 election had not taken place, application of Article 52(1) 
in the first instance was precluded.60 
Senior officials within the EAC Partner States and justices on the 
highest national courts have supported a movement that would allow 
appeals from the highest national courts to the EACOJ.61  This would 
also give the Court greater authority to punish corruption, strengthen 
the judiciaries within the region, and harmonize the judicial branches 
of the Partner States and the EAC itself.62 
There is also a proposal to amend the EAC treaty to give the 
EACOJ the authority to try human rights violators.63  As the 
Honorable Justice Harold Reginald Nsekela, President of the EACOJ, 
has argued: 
If East Africans are serious about meaningful regional integration, 
they must be willing and prepared to invest in it, particularly in 
institutions that will make people develop with dignity.  A fully-
fledged East African Court of Justice with all its attendant 
jurisdictional roles is one such institution.  East African leaders 
cannot expect a strong East African Community unless they invest 
 
55 Nyong’o, supra note 53, at 2. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 3. 
58 Id. at 13. 
59 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 52(1). 
60 Nyong’o v. Atty Gen. of Kenya 14-22, Reference No. 1, (E. Afr. Ct. J. 2006), 
http://www.eacj.org/docs/judgments/EACJ_Reference_No_1_2006.pdf. 
61 James Karuhanga, East Africa: EAC Judges Call for Stronger Judicial Systems, 
ALLAFRICA.COM (Dec. 10, 2009), http://allafrica.com/stories/200912100297.html. 
62 J. Oyuke, EAC Judges Call for a Harmonized Judiciary, THE STANDARD, (Jan. 3, 
2010), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/archives/business/InsidePage.php?id=2000000137 
&cid=14&. 
63 Fred Oluoch, East Africa: Bid to Let Regional Court of Justice Try Genocide and 
Human Rights Suspects, ALLAFRICA.COM (Oct. 12, 2009), http://allafrica.com/stories         
/200910120115.html. 
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in institutions that will guarantee its existence.  We should not 
expect to reap where we have not sown. 64 
The EAC National Human Rights Commission has reviewed the 
draft EAC Bill of Rights.65  “The EAC draft Bill attempts to 
harmonise the rights and freedoms obtaining in the Partner States.  It 
examines the various national constitutions and other international 
and regional instruments with a view to standardize and adopt 
international best practices.”66  The Bill, which contains the right to a 
fair hearing67, would require Partner States to guarantee a large 
number of rights or be in violation of the EAC Treaty, which in turn 
would grant the EACOJ greater jurisdiction. 
Partner States may request advisory opinions from the EACOJ.68  
Additionally, Partner States can refer a matter to the EACOJ for 
adjudication where that state “considers that another Partner State or 
an organ or institution of the Community has failed to fulfil [sic] an 
obligation under . . . [the EAC] Treaty or has infringed a provision of 
. . . [the EAC] Treaty.”69  The EAC Treaty also provides: 
A Partner State may refer for determination by the Court, the 
legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action on the 
ground that it is ultra vires or unlawful or an infringement of the 
provisions of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application 
or amounts to a misuse or abuse of power.70 
Where a question is raised before a national court regarding the 
validity of some act by the Community, the court may request the 
EACOJ to give a preliminary ruling.71  In such a case, the national 
 
64 Harold Reginald Nsekela, The Role of the East African Court of Justice in the 
Integration Process (2009) (Paper presented at Third East African Community Media 
Summit). 
65 Press Release, EAC Department of Corporate Communications and Public Affairs, 
Heads of Human Rights’ Commissions Review EAC Draft Bill of Rights, (June 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.news.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id 
=250:heads-of-human-rights-commissions-review-eac-draft-bill-of-rights&catid=48:eac    
-latest&Itemid=69; Press Release, EAC Department of Corporate Communications and 
Public Affairs, Heads of Human Rights Commissions Recommend Draft EAC Bill of 
Rights to Council of Ministers’, (June 4, 2010), available at http://www.news.eac.int 
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=253:nhrcs-recommend-bill-of-rights 
&catid=48:eac-latest&Itemid=69 (The National Human Rights Commission has 
recommended the Bill of Rights to the EAC Council of Ministers and will be discussed at 
EAC Conference on Good Governance in August). 
66 Press Release, EAC Department of Corporate Communications and Public Affairs, 
Heads of Human Rights Commissions Review EAC Draft Bill of Rights, supra note 65. 
67 Id. 
68 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 36. 
69 Id. art. 28(1). 
70 Id. art. 28(2). 
71 Id. art. 34. 
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court is merely asking the EACOJ for an opinion on the matter and is 
still responsible for issuing the ultimate decision.  The nati nal court 
does not have to request such a ruling and can interpret the EAC 
Treaty on its own.72  However, this is subject to the caveat that any 
decisions made by the EACOJ on “similar matter[s]” have 
precedence.73 
Any natural or legal person who is a resident of a Partner State may 
refer any matter regarding “the legality of any Act, regulation, 
directive, decision or action of a Partner State or an institution of the 
Community on the grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, 
decision or action is unlawful or is an infringement of the . . . [EAC] 
Treaty.”74  In Nyong’o, the Attorney General of Kenya argued that the 
claimants did not have locus standi and, therefore, no cause of action 
existed for the claimants.75  The court recognized that in order for an 
adverse litigant to possess locus standi he must: (1) have sufficient 
interest in the subject matter of the adjudication, and (2) “be seeking a 
remedy in respect of a legal right, which has been infringed or 
violated.”76  However, the Court determined that these requirements 
apply more to “actions in tort and suits for breach of statutory duty or 
breach of contract. . . . [A] cause of action created by statute or other 
legislation . . . [has] its parameters . . . defined by the statute or 
legislation which creates it.”77  Therefore, since Article 30 imposes no 
locus standi requirement, no such requirement exists for suits brought 
under Article 30.78  The same rule applies for Articles 28, governing 
Partner States, and 29, governing the EAC Secretary General.  As 
such, the EACOJ like the COMESA COJ can entertain suits from an 
extremely broad range of litigants.  This is hardly the practice in the 
European Court of Justice or even the International Court of Justice, 
which entertains suits between States only. 
Where the EAC Secretary General considers that a Partner State 
has violated the EAC Treaty, its findings are submitted to that Partner 
State to submit its observations on the findings.79  Where such state 
fails to submit observations within four months, or where the 
observations are not satisfactory, the Secretary General then refers the 
matter to the Council, who must then decide to either immediately 
 
72 Id. art. 33(1). 
73 Id. art. 33(2). 
74 Id. art. 30. 
75 Nyong’o v. Atty Gen. of Kenya 12–13, Reference No. 1, (E. Afr. Ct. J. 2006), 
http://www.eacj.org/docs/judgments/EACJ_Reference_No_1_2006.pdf. 
76 Id. at 12. 
77 Id. at 15. 
78 Id. at 16–17. 
79 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 29(1). 
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resolve the issue or order the Secretary General to submit the matter 
to the EACOJ.80 
The Summit, the highest organ in the community, can request 
advisory opinions.81  The EAC Council, the second-highest organ in 
the community, may also request advisory opinions.82 
On April 29, 2009, the EACOJ released an advisory opinion on the 
conflicting principles of variable geometry and consensus in the 
EAC’s decision-making process which I have discussed at length 
elsewhere.83 
The EACOJ has jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes 
between the EAC and its employees where the dispute arises out of 
“terms and conditions of employment . . . or the application and 
interpretation of the staff rules and regulations and terms and 
conditions of service of the [EAC].”84  The EACOJ can also hear 
disputes arising from: 
[A]n arbitration clause contained in a contract or agreement which 
confers such jurisdiction to which the Community or any of its 
institutions is a party; or . . . a dispute between the Partner States 
regarding this Treaty if the dispute is submitted to it under a special 
agreement between the Partner States concerned; or . . . an 
arbitration clause contained in a commercial contract or agreement 
in which the parties have conferred jurisdiction on the Court.85 
On November 20, 2009, the EAC Summit ratified a protocol 
establishing the EAC Common Market.86  The protocol states “[a]ny 
dispute between the Partner States arising from the interpretation or 
application of this Protocol shall be settled in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty.”87  Furthermore, the Partner States 
guaranteed: 
(a) [A]ny person whose rights and liberties as recognised by this 
Protocol have been infringed upon, shall have the right to redress, 
even where this infringement has been committed by persons acting 
 
80 Id. art. 29(2)–(3). 
81 Id. art. 36. 
82 Id. arts. 14(4) and 36. 
83 In the Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the E. Afr. Cmty. for an 
Advisory Op., Application No. 1 of 2008, (E. Afr. Ct. of J. 2008), http://www.EACoJ.org 
/advisory_opinions.php (follow “Advisory Opinion no.1 of 2008 hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2010).  See James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible 
Legal Regimes, 35 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG., 572 (2010). 
84 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 31. 
85 Id. art. 32. 
86 Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, 
EAST AFRICAN BUSINESS COUNCIL,(Adopted Nov. 20, 2009) http://eabc.info/node/410 
(follow “EAC Common Market Protocol.doc hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 24 2010). 
87 Id. art. 54(1). 
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in  their official capacities; and (b) the competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authority or any other competent 
authority, shall rule on the rights of the person who is seeking 
redress.88 
Judges on the EACOJ may hold office for a maximum of seven 
years.89  A judge is to hold office for his or her full term unless: (1) 
s/he resigns, (2) s/he attains the age of 70, (3) s/he dies, or (4) s/he is 
removed from office in accordance with the EAC Treaty.90  Under 
Article 26(1), a judge may only be removed from office by the 
Summit: 
 (a) for misconduct or for inability to perform the functions of his 
or her office due to infirmity of mind or body; . . . 
 (b) in the case of a judge who also holds judicial office or other 
public office in a Partner State– 
 (i) is removed from that office for misconduct or due to 
inability to perform the functions of the office for any reason; 
or 
 (ii) resigns from that office following allegation of 
misconduct or of inability to perform the functions of the office 
for any reason; 
 (c) if the Judge is adjudged bankrupt under any law in force in a 
Partner State; or 
 (d) if the Judge is convicted of an offence involving dishonesty 
or fraud or moral turpitude under any law in force in a Partner 
State.91 
The Summit may also suspend a judge when an investigation as to 
misconduct is pending or where the judge is charged with an offense 
under Article 26(1)(d).92 
A.  The EACOJ’s Jurisprudence 
Based on the EACOJ’s decisions in Nyong’o, discussed above, 
East African Law Society, discussed below, Katabazi, discussed 
below, and the events surrounding those decisions, it would seem that 
the EACOJ has a greater amount of independence than intended by 
the drafters of the EAC Treaty.  As will be seen in the following 
analysis of East African Law Society, the Court has asserted itself as 
the supreme authority over the EAC Treaty. 
In November 2006, the EACOJ issued an interim order to prevent 
Kenya’s appointment of representatives to the EALA and, in March 
 
88 Id. art. 54(2). 
89 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 25(1). 
90 Id. art. 25(2). 
91 Id. art. 26(1). 
92 Id. art. 26(2). 
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07, the Court d cide  in Nyong’o that citizens of Kenya, despite 
having no locus standi, could challenge Kenya’s appointments under 
Article 30 of the EAC Treaty.93  The EAC Council criticized this 
exercise of jurisdiction and recommended to the Summit that certain 
amendments be passed to curtail the Court’s power, ultimately 
resulting in the EAC Treaty’s amendment on December 14, 2006.94  
These amendments included: (1) restructuring the Court into two 
divisions, a First Instance Division and an Appellate Division; (2) 
adding additional grounds for removing a judge from office; “[t]o 
limit the Court’s jurisdiction so as not to apply to ‘jurisdiction 
conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner States’”; (3) adding in a 
two-month time limit for cases brought by legal and natural persons; 
and (4) providing grounds for appeal to the Appellate Division of the 
EACOJ.95 
The amendments allow the removal from office of an EACOJ 
judge who also holds judicial office in a Partner State where that 
judge is removed from office for misconduct in that position.96  At the 
time this amendment was passed the two Kenyan judges were in the 
middle of just such a suspension following allegations of corruption 
against them made in 2003.97  The Kenyan government attempted to 
get these two justices, Justices Moijo ole Keiwua and Kasanga 
Mulwa, removed from the EACOJ bench pursuant to the 
amendments, but their efforts were stopped dead in their tracks.98 
Several East African national law societies, using Article 30, then 
challenged the legality under Article 150 [Amendment of the Treaty] 
of the EAC Treaty of the ratification procedures that were employed 
for these amendments.99  The four respondents, as in Nyong’o, 
 
93 E. Afr. L. Soc’y v. Att’y Gen. of Kenya, Ref. No. 3 of 2007, 2–3 (E. Afr. Ct. of J. 
2007) http://www.saflii.org/ea/cases/EACOJ/2008/1.pdf [hereinafter E. Afr. L. Soc’y].  For 
more on this see Natural and Legal Persons, infra note 95. 
94 E. Afr. L. of Soc’y., Ref. No. 3 of 2007 at 3–4 (While the final decision in Nyong’o 
was not released until four months after the amendments, the Court had announced that it 
was granting the claimants jurisdiction in November 2006). 
95 Id., supra note 93 at 4–5(emphasis removed).  See also Treaty Establishing the East 
African Community, supra note 37, arts. 23(2) [hereinafter Role of the Court], 26(1)–(2) 
[hereinafter Removal from Office and temporary Membership of the Court], 27(1) 
[hereinafter Jurisdiction of the Court], 30 [hereinafter Legal and Natural Persons], 35(a) 
[hereinafter Appeals]. 
96 Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 26(1)(b). 
97 Kibaki Rails at EAC Court as Rwanda, Burundi Join Up, THE EAST AFRICAN (Dec. 
4, 2006), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/252342/-/t6awg5z/-/index.html. 
98 Mwalimu Mati, Kenya is Guilty of Judicial Interference, THE EAST AFRICAN (Feb. 
26, 2007), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/opOrEd/-/434748/253402/-/rbk891z/-/index 
.html. 
99 E. Afr. L. Soc’y, supra note 93, at 2. 
258 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 12, 245 
challenged the capacity of the claimant law societies to bring the issue 
before the Court.  The Attorney General of Tanzania and the 
Secretary General of the EAC argued “that under international law, 
the applicants were not competent to challenge the sovereign right of 
the Partner States to amend the Treaty to which they were parties.”100  
The EACOJ concluded that the claimants were not challenging the 
Partner States’ sovereign right to amend, rather they were contesting 
the failure to abide by the amendment procedures prescribed by the 
EAC Treaty.101 
The Attorney General of Uganda argued that the claim was 
“incompetent and misconceived because there was no dispute 
amongst the parties to the [EAC] Treaty.”102  However, because 
Article 30 gives legal persons the right to petition the court when 
there is an infringement of the Treaty, this argument was deemed 
irrelevant.103 
The Attorney General of Kenya argued that the amendments were 
actually decisions of the Summit, and thus, not reviewable under 
Article 30.104  The Court decided that even though Article 30 makes 
no mention of an organ of the Community, restricting the Article so 
that it could not be used where an organ violated the Treaty would 
defeat its purpose.105  Further, the court held that: 
The alleged infringement is the totality of the process of the Treaty 
amendment, which amendment was, and can only be made by the 
parties to the Treaty, namely the Partner States, acting together 
through the organs of the Community.  It follows that if in the 
amendment process the Treaty was infringed, it was infringed by 
the Partner States.  The reference therefore cannot be barred on the 
ground that its subject matter are decisions and actions of organs of 
the Community.106 
Therefore, the Court determined that it had jurisdiction. 
The EACOJ went on to conclude that the ratification process used 
in making the amendments constituted an infringement of Articles 
150, 5(3)(g), and 7(1)(a) of the EAC Treaty because the Partner States 
had not allowed the participation of the private sector and civil 
society in the drafting of the amendments.107  However, the Court 
decided not to invalidate the amendments because “[t]he infringement 
was not a conscious one[;] . . . after this clarification of the law on the 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 13. 
102 Id. at 9. 
103 Id. at 13–14. 
104 Id. at 9. 
105 Id. at 15. 
106 Id. at 16. 
107 Id. at 31. 
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matter the infringeme t is not likely to recur[; and] . . . not all the 
resultant amendments are incompatible with the Treaty objectives       
. . . .”108 
In the case of Katabazi v. Secretary General of the East African 
Community, the EACOJ was petitioned to determine the lawfulness of 
the detention of Ugandan prisoners.109  Sixteen people were brought 
before the Ugandan High Court and charged with treason.110  The 
Court granted bail to fourteen of them and the court was immediately 
surrounded by security personnel who rearrested the men, interfered 
with the preparation of the bail documents, and took the men back to 
jail.111  The men were then taken before a military General Court 
Martial and charged with unlawful possession of firearms and 
terrorism, stemming from the same facts as the previous charges.112  
The issues of interference with court process and conducting 
simultaneous civil and military prosecutions were brought before the 
Constitutional Court of Uganda, which ruled that the interference was 
unconstitutional and that bail had to be granted to the men.113  The 
men were not released and the issue was brought before the 
EACOJ.114 
The respondents, the Secretary General of the East African 
Community and the Attorney General of The Republic of Uganda, 
challenged the EACOJ’s jurisdiction to deal with matters of human 
rights considering that no such jurisdiction had been granted by the 
EAC Treaty or by the Council under Article 27(2).115  The Court 
stated that “[t]he quick answer is: No [this court] does not have 
[jurisdiction].”116  The Court went on to say: 
 It very [sic] clear that jurisdiction with respect to human rights 
requires a determination of the Council and a conclusion of a 
protocol to that effect.  Both of those steps have not been taken. It 
follows, therefore, that this Court may not adjudicate on disputes 
concerning violation of human rights per se.117 
 
108 Id. at 43–44. 
109 Katabazi v. Sec’y Gen. of the E. Afr. Cmty., Ref. No. 1 of 2007 (E. Afr. Ct. of J. 
2007), http://www.EACoJ.org/docs/judgements/JUDGMENT_REFERENCE_NO._1_OF 
_2007.pdf. 
110 Id. at 1. 
111 Id. at 1-2. 
112 Id. at 2. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 12. 
116 Id. at 14. 
117 Id. at 15. 
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Despite this, the Court determined that “[w]hile the Court will not 
assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not 
abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 
27(1) merely because the reference includes allegation of human 
rights violation.”118  In other words, as long as a dispute gives the 
EACOJ jurisdiction under Article 27, the fact that the dispute 
involves human rights is merely incidental. 
The EACOJ then discussed whether it had Article 27 jurisdiction.  
It determined that Article 23 provides that the EACOJ “shall ensure 
the adherence to law,” which meant that where the law has not been 
adhered to the EACOJ would have Article 27(1) jurisdiction to 
compel adherence.119  The Court then determined that Articles 5(1)120, 
6121, 7(2)122, and 8(1)(c)123 require Partner States to abide by the 
decisions of their courts.124  It held: 
 [T]he intervention by the armed security agents of Uganda to 
prevent the execution of a lawful Court order violated the principle 
of the rule of law and consequently contravened the Treaty.  
Abiding by the court decision is the corner stone of the 
independence of the judiciary which is one of the principles of the 
observation of the rule of law.125 
Therefore, since the issue in the case was whether Articles 5 
through 8 had been adhered to, Article 23 gave the EACOJ Article 
27(1) jurisdiction, making the issue of human rights incidental and 
giving the Court jurisdiction to hear the case.126 
 
118 Id. at 16. 
119 Id. at 23. 
120 Id. at 15.  The EAC Treaty states, “[t]he objectives of the Community shall be to 
develop policies and programmes [sic] aimed at widening and deepening co-operation 
among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and 
technology, defence [sic], security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit.”  
Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 5(1) (emphasis in original). 
121 Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007, at 15.  (“Article 6 sets out the fundamental principles 
of the Community which governs the achievement of the objectives of the Community, of 
course as provided in Article 5(1).  Of particular interest here is paragraph (d) which talks 
of the rule of law . . . and rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights”). 
122 Id. at 16.  The EAC Treaty states “[t]he Partner States undertake to abide by the 
principles of good governance, including adherence to the principles of democracy, the 
rule of law, social justice and the maintenance of universally accepted standards of human 
rights.”  Treaty Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 7(2) (emphasis in original). 
123 Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007, at 16.  Article 8(a)(c) of the EAC Treaty states “[t]he 
partner states shall . . . abstain from any measures likely to jeopardize the achievement of 
those objectives or the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.”  Treaty 
Establishing the EAC, supra note 37, art. 8. 
124 Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007, at 15–23. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 23. 
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The EACOJ based its decision in Katabazi on th  objectives and 
purposes clauses of the Treaty, which are regarded as preambles that 
do not create binding obligations.  Objectives and purposes clauses 
are, therefore, not thought of as creating independent or substantive 
grounds for granting relief.  Rather, they are meant to give the treaty 
context.  In 2000, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal put it this 
way: 
[W]hen one is dealing with the object and purpose of a treaty, 
which is the most important part of the treaty’s context, the object 
and purpose does not constitute an element independent of that 
context.  The object and purpose is not to be considered in isolation 
from the terms of the treaty; it is intrinsic to its text.  It follows that, 
under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention127, a treaty’s object and 
purpose is to be used only to clarify the text, not to provide 
independent sources of meaning that contradict the clear text.128 
Notwithstanding this, the EACOJ determined that Article 5(1), 
which spells out one of the objectives of the Community, requires 
Partner States to abide by the decisions of their courts.  The Katabazi 
decision illustrates the interpretive boldness of the EACOJ not only in 
seizing jurisdiction over cases that raise sovereignty questions for the 
member states but also in creatively using preambular provisions of 
the Treaty Establishing the EACOJ to determine cases brought before 
 
127 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, done May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S 331, 8 I.L.M. 69.  It states: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
128 United States v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. DEC 130-A28-FT, 2000 WL 
1901311, at ¶ 58 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Dec. 19, 2000) (footnote not in original). 
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it when such cases involve human rights, which is not an enumerated 
base for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ground. 
IV 
THE ECOWAS COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE 
The Treaty of ECOWAS (Treaty) establishes the Community 
Court of Justice (CCJ).129  The Treaty limits the CCJ’s authority to 
“perform[ing its] functions and act[ing] within the limits of the 
powers conferred on [it] by this Treaty and by the Protocols relating 
thereto.”130  However, “[j]udgments [sic] of the, Court of Justice [are] 
binding on the Member States, the Institutions of the Community and 
on individuals and corporate bodies.”131  The CCJ’s judges were 
appointed on January 30, 2001.132 
The Community Court Protocol (Protocol) came into force on 
November 5, 1996,133 and was amended in 2005.134  The Protocol 
expanded the CCJ’s authority by mandating: 
The Court has competence to adjudicate on any dispute relating to 
the following: 
 a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty, 
Conventions and Protocols of the Community; 
 b) the interpretation and application of the regulations, 
directives, decisions and other subsidiary legal instruments 
adopted by ECOWAS; 
 c) the legality of regulations, directives, decisions and other 
subsidiary legal instruments adopted by ECOWAS; 
 d) the failure by Member States to honour their obligations 
under the Treaty, Conventions and Protocols, regulations, 
directives, or decisions of ECOWAS; 
 e) the provisions of the Treaty, Conventions and Protocols, 
regulations, directives or decisions of ECOWAS Member 
States; 
 f) the Community and its officials; and 
 
129 Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States arts. 6(1)(e), 
15(1), done July 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 (replacing the 1975 Treaty of Lagos) [hereinafter 
Treaty Establishing ECOWAS]. 
130 Id. art. 7(2). 
131 Id. art. 15(4)(e). 
132 ECOWAS Cmty. Ct. J., AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, 
http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_subreg/ecowas/ecowas_home.html (last visited Oct. 24, 
2010). 
133 A.O. Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS Community Court Protocol and the 
Constitutions of the Member States, 12 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 111, 115 (2010). 
134 Id. at 117.  See also ECOWAS, Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, Jan 19, 
2005, available at http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/content_files/files/HD14.doc. 
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 g) the action for damages against a Community institution or 
an official of the Community for any action or omission in the 
exercise of official functions.135 
The Treaty also mandated the creation of an Arbitration Tribunal 
of the Community.136  The Arbitration Tribunal has yet to be set up, 
but until then the Protocol allows the CCJ to act in that capacity.137 
The Treaty mandates that “[t]he status, composition, powers, 
procedure and other issues concerning the Court of Justice shall be as 
set out in a Protocol relating thereto.”138  The Protocol mandates that 
the CCJ shall consist of seven judges, appointed by the Authority of 
Heads of States and Government from a pool of nominees, two from 
each state.139  Members of the CCJ are appointed for a five-year term 
and may be reappointed only once. 
The Treaty states “[t]he Court of Justice shall carry out the 
functions assigned to it independently of the Member States and the 
institutions of the Community.”140  Furthermore, the Member States 
agreed to “undertake to co-operate in judicial and legal matters with a 
view to harmonising their judicial and legal systems.”141  The 
Protocol allows national courts to present certified questions on issues 
of interpretation and application of the Treaty and other ECOWAS 
texts.142 
Article 10 of the Protocol allows the CCJ to give advisory opinions 
to any Member State, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, 
and any ECOWAS institution upon request.143  The Treaty also 
provides that “[a]ny dispute regarding the interpretation or the 
application of the provisions of this Treaty shall he [sic] amicably 
settled through direct agreement without prejudice to the provisions 
of this Treaty and relevant Protocols.”144  In the event such agreement 
cannot be reached, “either party or any other Member States or the 
Authority may refer the matter to the Court of the Community whose 
decision shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal.”145  The 
 
135 ECOWAS Cmty. Ct. J., Protocol A/P.1/7/91, (Adopted July 6, 1991, Came into 
Force Nov. 5, 1996, Amended by Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 in 2005), art. 
9(1). 
136 Treaty Establishing the ECOWAS, supra note 129, art. 16(1). 
137 ECOWAS Cmty. Ct. J., Protocol A/P.1/7/91, supra note 135, art. 9(5). 
138 Treaty Establishing the ECOWAS, supra note 129, art. 15(2). 
139 ECOWAS Cmty. Ct. J., Protocol, A/P.1/7/91, supra note 135, art. 2. 
140 Treaty Establishing the ECOWAS, supra note 129, art. 15(3). 
141 Id. art. 57(1). 
142 ECOWAS Cmty. Ct. J., Protocol, A/P.1/7/91, supra note 135, art. 10(f). 
143 Id. art. 10. 
144 Treaty Establishing the ECOWAS, supra note 129, art. 76(1). 
145 Id. art. 76(2). 
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Protocol authorizes Member States and the Executive Secretary to 
bring an action before the CCJ for the alleged failure of a Member 
State to perform an obligation.146  Furthermore, Member States, the 
Council of Ministers, and the Executive Secretary may bring a 
proceeding before the CCJ to determine the legality of an action in 
relation to any ECOWAS text.147 
The Authority of Heads of States and Government also has the 
“power to grant the Court the power to adjudicate on any specific 
dispute that it may refer to the Court other than those specified in [the 
Protocol].”148  Individuals and corporate bodies may also bring a 
proceeding before the CCJ “for the determination of an act or inaction 
of a Community official which violates the rights of the individuals or 
corporate bodies.”149  Individuals are also explicitly granted the right 
to bring cases of violations of human rights before the CCJ.150 
Where an agreement gives the CCJ jurisdiction over dispute 
settlement, the CCJ has jurisdiction.151  The staff of any ECOWAS 
institution can also bring an action before the CCJ once it has 
“exhausted all appeal processes available . . . under the ECOWAS 
Staff Rules and Regulations.”152  Where an issue of interpretation as 
to the COMESA Treaty, COMESA protocols, or COMESA 
regulations arise within a Member State’s national court, such 
national court may, on its own or at the request of a party to the 
action, refer the issue to the CCJ for interpretation.153 
Prior to the 2005 amendment of the Protocol by the Supplemental 
Protocol,154 individuals were not allowed to bring suit in the CCJ.155  
This was a heavy restriction on the power of the CCJ to enforce the 
Treaty upon ECOWAS Member States and ECOWAS stood apart 
from other RTA judiciaries which, as we have seen so far, allow such 
cases.156  The 2003 case of Afolabi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria157 
and the 2004 case of Ukor v. Lalaye,158 discussed below, emphasized 
this fact.159 
 
146 ECOWAS Cmty. Ct. J., Protocol, A/P.1/7/91, supra note 135, art. 10(a). 
147 Id. art. 10(b). 
148 Id. art. 9(8). 
149 Id. art. 10(c). 
150 Id. art. 10(d). 
151 Id. art. 9(6). 
152 Id. art. 10(e). 
153 Id. art. 10(f). 
154 ECOWAS, Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, supra note 133. 
155 Enabulele, supra note 133, at 116–19. 
156 Id. 
157 Olajide Afolabi v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03, (2003). 
158 Ukor v. Lalaye, ECW/CCJ/APP/01/04, (2004). 
159 Enabulele, supra note 133, at 116–17. 
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In 2003, Nigeria closed its common border with B nin, which hurt 
many of the businesses along the border.160  A Nigerian citizen 
applied to the CCJ to have his suit heard on the ground that the border 
closure had caused loss to his business in violation of the Treaty.161  
Nigeria objected to the CCJ’s jurisdiction to hear the case under the 
Treaty and the Protocol.162  The CCJ agreed and dismissed the case.  
In 2004 Benin seized a national’s truck and goods.163  The citizen 
applied to the CCJ to quash the order that his truck and goods be 
seized as violative of the Treaty.164  Benin objected to jurisdiction 
and, again, the CCJ dismissed the case.165  These cases are, in large 
part, the reason why the Supplemental Protocol was established in 
2005.166 
Since the 2005 amendments to the Protocol many citizens of 
Member States have brought cases before the CCJ, and many have 
won.  In 2008, a citizen of Niger brought suit in the CCJ against Niger 
for failing to protect her human rights, as she had been a slave for 
almost her entire life.167  The citizen won the case and was awarded 
about $17,000.168 
A more controversial decision of the CCJ came in 2009 in the case 
of Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education 
Commission.169  In this case, SERAP, a human rights NGO, brought 
suit in the CCJ as a legal person against Nigeria for human rights 
violations on the ground that Nigeria had not adequately implemented 
Nigeria's Basic Education Act and Child's Rights Act of 2004, and 
had thus violated both the African Charter and the ECOWAS 
Treaty.170  Nigeria alleged that the CCJ did not have jurisdiction, 
 
160 Id. at 116. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 117. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 116–19. 
167 Peter Walker, Niger Guilty in Landmark Slavery Case, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 27, 
2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/27/niger-slave-court; see 
also Koraou v. Fed. Rep. of Niger, Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08 (2008) (unofficial 
translation) http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/496b41fa2.pdf. 
168 Walker, supra note 167. 
169 Koraou, ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08. 
170 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 
Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/APP/080 (2009) (International Network for Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 2009) http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id 
=1143047. 
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notwithstanding the express provision of the Protocol.171  The CCJ 
noted that Article 9(4) of the Protocol states “[t]he [CCJ] has 
jurisdiction to determine cases of violation of human rights that occur 
in any Member State”; that Article 4(g) of the ECOWAS Treaty 
affirms that the Member States must adhere to the “recognition 
promotion and protection of human and peoples” rights in accordance 
with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights”; and that Article 17 of the African Charter states that “[e]very 
individual shall have the right to education.”172  Thus, the CCJ 
determined that it had jurisdiction, but there has yet to be a decision 
on the substantive issues of the case, namely whether Nigeria had 
actually violated its citizens’ right to an education.173 
Some commentators believe a severe conflict between the CCJ and 
the Constitutions of the various Members States is inevitable, and that 
the only reason this conflict has yet to come to light is due to the 
relative youth of the CCJ.174  The 2005 Protocol does not give citizens 
of Member States the right to have cases involving the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty.  Instead, it authorizes citizens to bring 
suits before the CCJ that involve, generally, alleged violations of the 
human rights.175  As pointed out by A.O. Enabulele: 
 Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Benin, 1990; 
Article 4 of the Constitution of the Gambia, 1997; Article 1(2) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992; Article 2 of the 
Constitution of Liberia, 1984; [and] Section 1(3) of the Constitution 
[of The] Federal Republic of Nigeia, 1999; [make] the various 
constitutions supreme and binding on all persons and authorities 
within their respective spheres of influence.  Any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of any of the constitutions, within 
its sway is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency.176 
Therefore, if the CCJ were to hear a human rights case and find 
that some action by a Member State violates the Treaty, yet one of 
that Member State’s national courts also determined the action was 
authorized under the national constitution, then there would be an 
irreconcilable conflict between national and international law.177  
However, as I have observed elsewhere, the supremacy of national 
Constitutions over international law particularly in commonwealth 
African countries is slowly ebbing away.178 
 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Enabulele, supra note 133, at 111. 
175 ECOWAS Cmty. Ct. J., Protocol, A/P.1/7/91, supra note 135, art. 10(d). 
176 Enabulele, supra note 133, at 121. 
177 Id. at 121–34. 
178 James Thuo Gathii, Agora: Piracy Prosecution: Kenya’s Piracy Prosecutions, 104 
AM. J. INT’L L. 416 (2010).  
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V 
THE SADC TRIBUNAL 
The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 
(Treaty) establishes the Tribunal “to ensure adherence to and the 
proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary 
instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred 
to it.”179  Further emphasis is given to this objective in Article 32: 
“[a]ny dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this 
Treaty, the interpretation, application or validity of Protocols or other 
subsidiary instruments made under this Treaty, which cannot be 
settled amicably, shall be referred to the Tribunal.”180  The Treaty 
mandates “[t]he decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and 
binding.”181  Furthermore, subsection 2 of Article 16 of the Treaty 
states “[t]he composition, powers, functions, procedures and other 
related matters governing the Tribunal shall be prescribed in a 
Protocol, which shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 22 of 
this Treaty, form an integral part of this Treaty, adopted by the 
Summit.”182  Article 22 is the article that addresses the requirements 
of ratification process for protocols to the treaty.183 
The Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof was 
passed by the Summit in August 2000 in accordance with Article 16 
of the Treaty.184  While the Tribunal has begun operating, the Protocol 
on Tribunal has not yet been ratified by two-thirds of Member States 
as required by Article 22.185  There is much dispute over whether this 
protocol in particular can be given effect without such ratification. I 
will return to this topic below.  The Protocol on Tribunal mandated 
the Council to determine where the seat of the Tribunal would be 
located.186  The Council eventually chose Windhoek, Namibia.187 
 
179 Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community, arts. 1(g), 
16(1), done Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116 [hereinafter Treaty Establishing SADC]. 
180 Id. art. 32. 
181 Id. art. 16(5). 
182 Id. art. 16(2). 
183 Id. art. 22. 
184 Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, South African 
Development Community, adopted Aug. 14, 2010, http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/docs 
/Protocol_on_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof.pdf [hereinafter SADC Protocol on Tribunal]. 
185 Press Release, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Status and Meaning of 
SADC Treaty and Tribunal Protocol (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.hrforumzim.com/press 
/SADC%20Tribunal%20Statement.pdf. 
186 Treaty Establishing SADC, supra note 179, art. 13. 
187 SADC Tribunal, SADC, http://www.sadc.int/tribunal/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
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The Treaty for the Establishment of SADC states “[m]embers of 
the Tribunal shall be appointed for a specified period.”188  The 
Protocol mandates “The Tribunal shall consist of not less than ten 
(10) Members, appointed from nationals of Member States who 
possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices in their respective Member States or who are jurists of 
recognised [sic] competence.”189  The Summit, on recommendation of 
the Council, is to appoint the ten members,190 five of which it is to 
designate as “regular Members,” those who “shall sit regularly on the 
Tribunal.”191  The other five “constitute a pool from which the 
President [of the Tribunal] may invite a Member to sit on the Tribunal 
whenever a regular Member is temporarily absent or is otherwise 
unable to carry out his or her functions.”192  The Protocol states that 
the Tribunal is constituted by three members, but it may decide to 
constitute all five for any case.193  The Tribunal only sits when there is 
a case submitted to it194 and the President of the Tribunal gets to 
decide who shall sit for any case.195  The Council may increase the 
number of members on a proposal from the Tribunal.196 
At any time, none of the members may be nationals of the same 
state.197  To this end, each Member State nominates one candidate and 
the Council chooses amongst these candidates, with due consideration 
given to gender representation.198  The Members of the Tribunal serve 
a five-year term and may only be re-appointed for an additional five-
year term.199  While the Tribunal only sits when there is a case, the 
Council may decide to make it a full-time position and, if it does, 
Members would no longer be allowed to hold any other office or 
employment.200  Regardless of this, Members are not allowed to 
exercise any political or administrative function or engage in any 
trade that would interfere with his or her duties, impartiality, or 
independence as a member of the Tribunal.201  The President of the 
Tribunal is elected by the Members of the Tribunal and holds this 
 
188 Treaty Establishing SADC, supra note 179, art. 16(3). 
189 SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 184, art. 3(1) (internal footnote omitted). 
190 Id. art. 4(4). 
191 Id. art. 3(2). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. art. 3(3). 
194 Id. art. 6(4). 
195 Id. art. 3(4). 
196 Id. art. 3(5). 
197 Id. art. 3(6). 
198 Id. arts. 4(1)–(3). 
199 Id. art. 6(1). 
200 Id. arts. 6(2) and (3)(a)–(b). 
201 Id. art. 9(1). 
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position for 3 years.202  Membe s and the President may resign at any 
time and may nly be dismissed in accordance with the Tribunal 
Rules.203 
With regard to the relationship between the tribunal and Member 
States, the Treaty for the Establishment of SADC provides that “the 
Members of the Tribunal . . . shall be committed to the international 
character of SADC, and shall not seek or receive instructions from 
any Member States, or from any authority external to SADC.”204  The 
Tribunal “may rule on a question of interpretation, application or 
validity of the provisions in issue if the question is referred to it by a 
court or tribunal of a Member State.”205 
The Tribunal also has original jurisdiction over: 
[A]ll disputes and all applications referred to it in accordance with 
the Treaty and this Protocol which relate to: 
(a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
(b) the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, 
all subsidiary instruments adopted within the framework of the 
Community, and acts of the institutions of the Community; 
[and] 
(c) all matters specifically provided for in any other agreements 
that Member States may conclude among themselves or within 
the community and which confer jurisdiction on the 
Tribunal.206 
The Tribunal is directed to develop its own case law, “having 
regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public 
international law and any rules and principles of the law of Member 
States.”207  The Protocol provides: “Where a dispute is referred to the 
Tribunal by any party the consent of other parties to the dispute [is] 
not . . . required.”208  The Tribunal does not have original jurisdiction, 
but it may give preliminary rulings in certain cases.209 
According to the Treaty for the Establishment of SADC, “The 
Tribunal shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit 
 
202 Id. art. 7(1). 
203 Id. art. 8. 
204 Treaty Establishing SADC, supra note 179, art. 17(2). 
205 SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 184, art. 16. 
206 Id. art. 14. 
207 Id. art. 21. 
208 Id. art. 15(3). 
209 Id. art. 16 (See the “Partner States” National Courts subsection of this section for an 
explanation of these instances). 
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or the Council may refer to it.”210  The SADC Summit and Council 
are the only entities that the Treaty and the Protocol allow to request 
advisory opinions.  The Tribunal has “exclusive jurisdiction over all 
disputes between [the] States and the Community. . . . [such disputes] 
may be referred to the Tribunal . . . by the competent institution or 
organ of the [C]ommunity.”211  The tribunal also has “exclusive 
jurisdiction over all disputes between natural or legal persons and the 
Community. . . . [such disputes] may be referred to the Tribunal . . . 
by the competent institution or organ of the Community.”212 
The Tribunal has “jurisdiction over disputes between Member 
States.”213  Where there is a dispute between the Community and a 
State, the Member State may refer the issue to the Tribunal.214  The 
Tribunal “may [also] rule on a question of interpretation, application 
or validity of the provisions in issue if the question is referred to it by 
a court or tribunal of a Member State for a preliminary ruling in 
accordance with this Protocol.”215  As such, the Tribunal has 
“jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in proceedings of any kind 
and between any parties before the courts or tribunals of Member 
States.”216  In addition, as is typical of other African RTA judiciaries, 
the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes between 
natural and legal persons217 and SADC and the person may bring the 
suit.  A natural or legal person may not bring suit against a Member 
State “unless he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is 
unable to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction.”218  Finally, the 
Tribunal has “exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes between the 
Community and its staff relating to their conditions of 
employment.”219 
The Tribunal’s legitimacy has been brought into sharp focus as a 
result of its decision on Zimbabwe’s land reform program.  Following 
that decision, many officials within Zimbabwe’s government argued 
that the Tribunal does not currently exist for reasons we shall see 
below.  The Tribunal has reported its findings to the Summit and is 
awaiting action to determine if the Tribunal’s decision should be 
 
210 Treaty Establishing SADC, supra note 179, art. 16(4); SADC Protocol on Tribunal, 
supra note 184, art. 20 (“The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions, 
which may be requested by the Summit or by the Council.”). 
211 SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 184, art. 17. 
212 Id. art. 18. 
213 Id. art. 15(1). 
214 Id. art. 17. 
215 Id. art. 16(2). 
216 Id. art. 16(1). 
217 Id. art. 18. 
218 Id. art. 15(2). 
219 Id. art. 19. 
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recorded by the M mber States.  The next part of this paper will now 
examine the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. 
A.  The SADC Tribunal’s Jurisprudence 
The case that started the controversy over the SADC Tribunal’s 
legitimacy is Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v. The Republic of Zimbabwe.220  In 
that case, the applicants, natural and legal persons, were landowners 
challenging Zimbabwe’s land reform program which essentially 
permitted taking the applicants’ land from them and redistributing 
it.221  The Tribunal determined that it only had jurisdiction if: (1) the 
applicants had standing in that they had “exhaust[ed] all available 
remedies or . . . [were] unable to proceed under the domestic 
jurisdiction of [Zimbabwe]”; and (2) the dispute related to 
interpretation and application of the Treaty.222 
The Tribunal first determined if the dispute was within its scope of 
jurisdiction.223  The applicants began their case at the Tribunal on 
October 11, 2007, with an application for an interim measure under 
Article 28 of the Protocol on Tribunal to restrain the government of 
Zimbabwe from removing the applicants from their land.224  
However, the respondent argued the applicants had not exhausted all 
of their local remedies as they had begun a case before the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe.225  The Tribunal, however, determined: 
The rationale for exhaustion of local remedies is to enable local 
courts to first deal with the matter because they are well placed to 
deal with the legal issues involving national law before them.  It 
also ensures that the international tribunal does not deal with cases 
which could easily have been disposed of by national courts.226 
Therefore, the Tribunal reasoned: 
[W]here the municipal law does not offer any remedy or the remedy 
that is offered is ineffective, the individual is not required to exhaust 
the local remedies.  Further, where . . . the procedure of achieving 
the remedies would have been unduly prolonged, the individual is 
not expected to exhaust local remedies.227 
 
220 Campbell Ltd. v. Rep. of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007, 2 (2008), 
http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2008/2.pdf. 
221 Id. at 4–7. 
222 Id. at 17–18. 
223 Id. at 17–26. 
224 Id. at 4. 
225 Id. at 19–21. 
226 Id. at 20. 
227 Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The Tribunal thus determined that if an applicant’s local remedies 
suffered from de facto exhaustion, the Tribunal would have 
jurisdiction.  In fact, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had already 
rendered a decision in the applicants’ case,228 as discussed below. 
The applicants in the Tribunal’s case were challenging Section 
16(B) of Amendment 17 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.229  
Subsection (3)(a) of that section states “a person having any right or 
interest in the [reorganized] land . . . shall not apply to a court to 
challenge the acquisition of the land by the State, and no court shall 
entertain any such challenge.”230  Therefore, the Tribunal determined, 
the amendment had “ousted the jurisdiction of courts of law [in 
Zimbabwe] from any case related to acquisition of agricultural land 
and that, therefore, the first and second Applicants were unable to 
institute proceedings under the domestic jurisdiction.”231  The 
Tribunal noted that this position was confirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Zimbabwe on January 22, 2008, in the applicants’ case.232 
The Tribunal next had to determine if there was a proper basis of 
jurisdiction such that it could hear the dispute; i.e., whether the 
dispute related to interpretation and application of the Treaty.233  On 
this issue, the respondent argued there was no such basis as the Treaty 
only mentions human rights as a principle of SADC and there is no 
protocol that governs human rights standards or agrarian reform.234  
The respondent went on to argue that, in the absence of such 
protocols, the Tribunal cannot adopt “[human rights] standards from 
other Treaties as this would amount to legislating on behalf of SADC 
Member States.”235  The Tribunal, however, noted that Article 21(b) 
of the Treaty mandates the Tribunal to develop its own jurisprudence 
and to do so having regard for general principles and rules of public 
international law.236  Article 4(c) requires Member States to act in 
accordance with “human rights, democracy and the rule of law.”237  
Therefore, as long as one of these interconnected principles had been 
violated by Zimbabwe, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute under Article 15(2) of the Treaty.  The Tribunal noted that 
Amendment 17 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe denied the 
 
228 Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform, 
and Resettlement, (124/06) [2008] ZWSC 1 (2008). 
229 Id. at 1. 
230 Id. at 12. 
231 Id. at 28. 
232 Id. at 1. 
233 Campbell Ltd. v. Rep. of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007 at 23–26. 
234 Id. at 23. 
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236 Id. at 24. 
237 Id. at 24–25. 
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respondents access to th  courts and the right to a fair hearing and so 
determined that their human rights, democracy, and the rule of law 
had been violated and that the Tribunal had jurisdiction.238 
After granting jurisdiction, the Tribunal went on to discuss the 
substantive questions raised in the case.  In its ruling, it held that the 
applicants had been discriminated against on the ground of race, that 
the respondent owed the applicants fair compensation for the lands 
that had been taken from them, and both the respondent and 
Amendment 17 itself were in breach of Articles 4(c)239 and 6(2)240 of 
the Treaty.241 
Zimbabwe did not comply with the Tribunal’s ruling.242  Instead, 
Zimbabwe argued it had not ratified the Protocol on Tribunal, and 
therefore, it did not have to abide by the decision of the Tribunal.  
Second, Zimbabwe argued that as the summit had not formally made 
it operational, the SADC Tribunal was not yet established, and as 
such, it did not in fact exist.243  The first of these two arguments is 
certainly the weaker.  Even though Article 22 of the Treaty states, 
“Each Protocol shall be binding only on the Member States that are 
party to the Protocol in question,” the Article which sets up the 
Tribunal, Article 16, states, “The composition, powers, functions, 
procedures and other related matters governing the Tribunal shall be 
prescribed in a Protocol, which shall, notwithstanding the provisions 
of Article 22 of this Treaty, form an integral part of this Treaty, 
adopted by the Summit.”244  In other words, once the protocol has 
been officially adopted it became binding on all Member States, as is 
the Treaty itself, regardless of individual ratification. 
The second argument is a bit stronger.  SADC protocols only come 
into force once they have been approved by the Summit on 
recommendation by the Council245 and are ratified by two-thirds of 
 
238 Id. at 26–41. 
239 (“SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following 
principles: . . . human rights, democracy and the rule of law”), Treaty Establishing SADC, 
supra note 179, art. 4(c). 
240 (“SADC and Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of 
gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture, ill health, disability, or such 
other ground as may be determined by the Summit.”)  Treaty Establishing SADC, supra 
note 179, art. 6(2). 
241 Campbell Ltd. v. The Rep. of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007, at 57–59. 
242 Ntungamili Nkomo, South African High Court Approves Legal Action Against 
Harare in Land Case, VOICE OF AMERICA, (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.voanews.com 
/zimbabwe/news/Zimbabwe-South-African-Group-Granted-Right-to-Sue-Zimbabwe-13 
Jan10-81347412.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
243 Press Release, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 185. 
244 Treaty Establishing the SADC, supra note 179, at arts. 22(9), 16(2). 
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the Member States.246  As of September 2009, only five of SADC’s 
fifteen Member States had ratified it.247  However, going back to 
Article 16, the two-thirds ratification requirement specifically does 
not apply to the Protocol on Tribunal.  Notably, the Article 22 two-
thirds ratification requirement, and the Article 16 exemption from that 
requirement, were added in 2001 when the Treaty was amended.248  
So even though some Zimbabwean officials have argued that the 2001 
Amendment itself is invalid, and therefore the exemption does not 
apply,249 this offers no support to Zimbabwe’s position because, if the 
amendment is invalid, so is the two-thirds ratification requirement 
itself. 
Perhaps the simplest and best argument for the enforcement of 
Tribunal decisions is that the ratification of the Protocol on Tribunal 
is irrelevant to the Tribunal’s existence and authority.  Article 9(1)(g) 
of the Treaty which establishes the Tribunal and Article 16(1) thereof 
spells out its jurisdiction.  It is important to note that Zimbabwe 
nominated a current Tribunal Member, Justice Antonia Guvava, to the 
Tribunal in 2005,250 which contradicts its claim that it does not 
believe the Tribunal to be in existence.  Justice Guvava was, in fact, 
appointed to the Tribunal and is one of the five alternate members of 
the court.251  In September 2009, Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa 
of Zimbabwe announced that they would be withdrawing Guvava 
from the Tribunal.252  It is noteworthy that no official action was ever 
taken on the part of Zimbabwe’s government to withdraw Guvava or 
to pull out from Tribunal participation.253 
On July 29, 2008, the High Court of South Africa decided in Von 
Abo v. Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others that 
citizens of South Africa whose property had been taken by the 
Zimbabwean government would be owed damages from the 
 
246 Id. art. 22(4). 
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government of South Africa where the government had failed to 
protect their interests through diplomatic intervention.254  The court 
made the following orders: South African citizens have a right to 
“diplomatic protection” from violations of their rights by the 
government of Zimbabwe to be given to them by the government of 
South Africa; the government of South Africa has a constitutional 
obligation to provide this protection; the government of South Africa 
had to remedy the violations of the applicant’s rights; and an award of 
damages to the applicant was postponed pending South Africa’s 
compliance with the order of the High Court and subsequent judicial 
proceedings.255 
On May 7, 2009, William Michael Campbell, the second applicant 
in the Tribunal’s Mike Campbell case discussed above, and Richard 
Thomas Etheredge petitioned the Tribunal for a declaration that 
Zimbabwe was in breach and contempt of the decision in Mike 
Campbell.256  The Tribunal made such a declaration in June 2009 and 
reported its finding to the Summit for appropriate action under Article 
32(5)257 of the Protocol on Tribunal.258 
The Von Abo applicant then went before the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa, whose decision was made on June 5, 2009.259  
Section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution of South Africa states “a High 
Court . . . may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of 
. . . any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional 
invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court.”  On June 5, 2009, the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
held that the order of the High Court did not need to be affirmed by 
the Constitutional Court in this instance because the High Court 
declared the conduct of the South African government to be invalid, 
rather than the conduct of the president individually within the 
meaning of Section 172(2)(a).260 
 
254 Von Abo v. Rep. of S. Afr. 2009 (2) SA 526 (T) (S. Afr.) (2009), 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/226.pdf [hereinafter Von Abo]. 
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256 Campbell v. Rep. of Zimbabwe,(SADC (T) 03/2009) [2009] SADCT 1 (2009). 
257 SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 184, art. 32(5) (“If the Tribunal establishes 
the existence of [a failure to comply with a decision of the Tribunal], it shall report its 
finding to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action.”). 
258 Campbell v. Rep. of Zimbabwe, (SADC (T) 03/2009) [2009] SADCT 1. 
259 Von Abo v. President of the Rep. of S. Afr., (CCT 67/08) [2009] ZACC 15 (2009). 
260 Id. at para. 49. 
276 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 12, 245 
B.  South Africa-Zimbabwe BIPPA and Fick 
In late November 2009, the governments of South Africa and 
Zimbabwe were on their way toward signing the Bilateral Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA).261  The BIPPA was 
aimed at providing security for South African investments in 
Zimbabwe but it expressly excluded past claims arising from 
Zimbabwe’s land reform program,262 the very program at issue in 
Mike Campbell.  In November 2009, South African legal consultants 
Jeremy Gauntlett and F.B. Pelser advised the South African 
government that if it were to sign BIPPA as it was, South Africa 
would be in violation of international law as it would compromise the 
Tribunal’s order and unlawfully terminate all remedies for past 
human rights violations, namely the uncompensated taking of land.263 
On November 27, 2009, AfriForum, a farmers’ rights organization, 
petitioned the High Court of South Africa to enjoin the South African 
government from signing BIPPA.264  The parties settled out of court 
that day in Fick v. Government of the Republic of South Africa.265  
The South African North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria announced 
the agreement in its entirety as follows: 
 1. The proposed Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (BIPPA) between the 
government of Zimbabwe and that of South Africa, to be concluded 
on 27 November 2009 in Harare, aims to create legal and other 
remedies for South African citizens over and above existing 
remedies in terms of international law. 
 2. The First and Second Respondent hereby give the Applicants 
(and other South African Citizens in the Applicants’ position) the 
assurance that BIPPA does not affect existing rights or remedies in 
terms of other sources of international law, in particular those in 
terms of the Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). 
 3. Thus the efficacy of the rulings and orders by the SADC 
Tribunal in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe [2008] SADC (T) 02/2007 (28 November 2008) and 
William Michael Campbell and Another v The Republic of 
Zimbabwe [2009] SADC (T) 03/2009 (05 June 2009) is not affected 
by entering into the proposed BIPPA, which rulings and orders the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa respects and 
undertakes to honour [sic] in terms of its own obligations in terms 
the SADC Treaty. 
 
261 BIPPA Goes Against SA Law—Legal Consultants, ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 
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265 Fick v. Rep. of S. Afr., (72068/09) [2009] ZAGPPHC (2009). 
2010] The Under-Appreciated Jurisprudence 277 
of Africa’s Regional Trade Judiciaries 
 
 4. The matter is removed from the roll, with no order as to 
costs.266 
That same day the governments of Zimbabwe and South Africa 
signed BIPPA.267 
On February 5, 2010, the North Gauteng High Court of South 
Africa in Pretoria continued where it had left off in 2008. 268  In the 
continued proceedings, the court ruled the government of South 
Africa was bound by the decision of the Tribunal in Mike 
Campbell.269  The court decided the South African government was at 
fault for not protecting the applicants’ property rights in Zimbabwe 
through the use of diplomatic intervention that the government had 
not complied with the High Court’s 2008 ruling, and, as such, 
determined that the South African government was “liable to pay to 
the applicant such damages as he may prove that he has suffered as a 
result of the violation of his rights by the Government of 
Zimbabwe.”270  AfriForum announced its intention to the Supreme 
Court of South Africa to fully enforce the Tribunal’s ruling in South 
Africa on February 23, 2010.271 
When the Fick settlement above is read in conjunction with the 
High Court’s rulings in the Von Abo case, it seems that South Africa 
has found a way to successfully protect its citizens while 
simultaneously abiding by the Tribunal’s decision in Mike Campbell 
and allowing Zimbabwe to continue seizing land.  As long as South 
Africa is willing to pay damages to its citizens who suffered injury as 
a result of Zimbabwe’s land reform program, it is abiding by Von 
Abo, Mike Campbell, and the BIPPA.  However, this ignores the fact 
that Zimbabwe continues to decline to abide by the Tribunal’s ruling, 
as discussed below.  South Africa would only be made whole if 
Zimbabwe abides by the BIPPA.272  The Commercial Farmers’ Union 
of Zimbabwe has reported that three farmers whose land was seized 
in December and January were covered by the BIPPA.273 
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On January 26, 2010, the High Court of Zimbabwe in Harare 
dismissed a suit by Gramara, Ltd., one of the other applicants in Mike 
Campbell, which sought a declaration that the Tribunal’s decision in 
Mike Campbell should be enforced in Zimbabwe.274  The court found 
that Amendment 17, Section 16B(3)(a)’s domestic constitutionality 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in Campbell (Pvy) 
Ltd. v. Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land 
Reform and Resettlement.275  Section 16B(3)(a)states, “a person 
having any right or interest in the [reorganized] land . . . shall not 
apply to a court to challenge the acquisition of the land by the State, 
and no court shall entertain any such challenge.”276  The court 
explained that since “the indirect consequence of the Tribunal's 
judgment is to impugn the legality of the programme sanctioned by 
the Supreme Court . . . . [and] challenge[s] the decision of the 
Supreme Court within its jurisdictional domain and thereby 
undermine[s] the authority of th[e Supreme] Court in Zimbabwe,” the 
Tribunal’s decision must be ignored.277  Furthermore, the court 
maintained, Section 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe proclaims: 
”This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any other 
law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void.”278  This is in clear conflict with 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which 
provides that, “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”  Since the 
Tribunal was “constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper 
interpretation of the provisions of [the SADC] Treaty and subsidiary 
instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred 
to it”279 and “[t]he decisions of the Tribunal [are] final and 
binding,”280 any violation of an order of the Tribunal is a violation of 
the SADC Treaty itself, regardless of domestic law. 
The High Court of Zimbabwe however determined that: 
 [E]nforcement of the [Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd.] decision . . . 
would ultimately necessitate the Government having to reverse all 
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the land acquisitions that have taken place since 2000.  Apart from 
the political enormity of any such exercise, it would entail the 
eviction, upheaval and eventual relocation of many if not most of 
the beneficiaries of the land reform programme.  This programme, 
despite its administrative and practical shortcomings, is 
quintessentially a matter of public policy in Zimbabwe, conceived 
well before the country attained its sovereign independence. 
 As for the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the applicants 
before the Tribunal and others in their position are absolutely 
correct in expecting the Government of Zimbabwe to comply with 
its obligations under the SADC Treaty and to implement the 
decisions of the Tribunal.  However, I take it that there is an 
incomparably greater number of Zimbabweans who share the 
legitimate expectation that the Government will effectively 
implement the land reform programme and fulfil [sic] their 
aspirations thereunder.  Given these countervailing expectations, 
public policy as informed by basic utilitarian precept would dictate 
that the greater public good must prevail.281 
Therefore, the Tribunal’s decision in Mike Campbell was found to be 
contrary to Zimbabwean law, both judicially and constitutionally, and 
Zimbabwean public policy.282 
It would seem that the SADC Tribunal as well as South African 
and Zimbabwean quite a bit on Zimbabwe’s land seizure.  SADC 
Tribunal Registrar Mkandawire has said: 
The Zimbabwe issue is no longer in the hands of the Tribunal.  We 
have done what we are mandated to do but cannot enforce the 
decisions.  We have reported the farm violations to the SADC 
summit.  It is the SADC summit which now has to enforce the 
decisions made by the Tribunal.283 
Therefore, the legitimacy of the Tribunal rests in the hands of the 
Summit. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper’s discussion of African regional trade judiciaries 
indicates that their relative invisibility in academic and policy 
discussions is unwarranted.  These judiciaries have exercised their 
jurisdiction over a burgeoning number of cases, particularly in the 
area of human rights and increasingly over economic and trade 
disputes.  The EACOJ as well as the SADC Tribunals have been 
exemplary in making bold decisions, which were not well received by 
Member States.  The ECOWAS Tribunal had its jurisdiction 
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expanded to include human rights cases.  These trends show that even 
while African governments are not fully committed to funding these 
regional judiciaries, these judiciaries have nevertheless begun to 
actively build an emerging regional jurisprudence that only a few 
short years ago did not exist.  That these judiciaries have been able to 
do as much with relatively little support from their respective member 
governments is testimony to the emerging cadre and high caliber of 
judges who staff these regional courts. 
What is needed now is a continued expansion of the number legal 
practitioners who can advise their clients on how these African RTA 
regimes offer them opportunities to use the remedies these RTA 
judiciaries are empowered to give.  Such remedies, of course, include 
the trade remedy regimes of antidumping and countervailing duty 
law, which have been borrowed from the WTO.  They, of course, also 
include the possibility of challenging the broad range of NTB 
measures that exist in trade between African countries.  The potential 
for using these African RTA judiciaries is, therefore, quite broad and 
this potential awaits future exploitation to the hilt. 
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